Randall Duchesneau v. Cornell University by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-12-2014 
Randall Duchesneau v. Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Randall Duchesneau v. Cornell University" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 284. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/284 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-1772 
________________ 
 
 
RANDALL DUCHESNEAU, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY; 
CORNELL GYMNASTICS CLUB; 
TUMBL TRAK 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cv-04856) 
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II  
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2014 
 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
  
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION   
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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I. Background 
Randall Duchesneau, a student at Cornell University and a member of Cornell’s 
student-run gymnastics club, was seriously injured while attempting to perform a back 
flip on a trampoline-type surface known as a TumblTrak.  Duchesneau filed suit in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cornell, the Cornell Gymnastics Club and the 
manufacturer of the TumblTrak, asserting negligence claims against Cornell and the 
Cornell Gymnastics Club, and negligence and product liability claims against 
TumblTrak.
1
  Specifically, Duchesneau alleged that he did not know how to use safely a 
TumblTrak and that Cornell was negligent because it failed to provide him with 
instruction, training, warnings, and supervision.  The case proceeded to a jury trial 
against Cornell.   
Prior to trial, Duchesneau filed a motion in limine asking the District Court to 
exclude, in its entirety, a “Waiver and Assumption of Risk” document (hereinafter, the 
“Document”) that he had signed as a condition of using the Cornell gymnasium.  Relying 
on N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-326, which renders releases in certain contexts void against 
public policy and thus unenforceable, the District Court partially granted the motion and 
prevented Cornell from introducing into evidence or otherwise relying on Duchesneau’s 
waiver of liability.  However, the District Court ruled that portions of the Document that 
were relevant to Cornell’s defense of assumption of the risk could be introduced into 
evidence.  Those portions ultimately shown to the jury included Duchesneau’s 
                                              
1
 Duchesneau ultimately dismissed his complaint against the Cornell Gymnastics Club 
and reached a settlement with TumblTrak.   
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acknowledgment that he had “full knowledge of the nature of the extent of all the dangers 
and risks associated with gymnastics including but not limited to … head injuries, and 
back injuries.”  App. at 2080a.   
When the modified Document was introduced to the jury, defense counsel stated 
as follows: 
Judge, this is the first time that we’ve had use of this document.  Obviously this 
was prepared at the request of Your Honor.  I didn’t know if it was appropriate for 
you to give an instruction to the jury that this is not the actual document but was 
something that you asked counsel to piece together.   
 
App. at 2985a.  The District Court judge admonished defense counsel for this statement.  
At trial, Cornell introduced evidence that it was reasonable and customary for 
Gymnastics Club members to use the gymnasium, including its TumblTrak, in a non-
coached, non-instructional ‘open gym’ format.  The jury unanimously found that Cornell 
was not negligent, and a verdict was entered in Cornell’s favor.  Duchesneau filed a Post-
Defense Verdict Motion for Mistrial, and a Motion for a New Trial.  The District Court 
denied both motions and Duchesneau appealed.
 2
   
Duchesneau argues that the District Court erred in 1) denying his motion in limine 
to preclude any reference to the Document, and 2) denying his motion for a new trial 
based on defense counsel’s allegedly improper reference to the Document during trial.   
II. Discussion 
 A “[d]istrict [c]ourt’s determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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2005).  To the extent an evidentiary issue turns on the interpretation of state law, 
however, we exercise plenary review.  Id.  We review for abuse of discretion a district 
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial.  Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 
1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1995). 
A. Motion in Limine 
 New York law provides that any agreement that exempts the owner or operator of 
a gymnasium “from liability for damages caused by or resulting from the negligence of 
the owner . . . shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly 
unenforceable.”  N.Y. Gen Oblig. Law § 5-326.  Here the District Court held that the 
“Waiver” component of the Document was unenforceable under § 5-326.  However, the 
District Court admitted portions of the Document as relevant to Cornell’s argument that 
Duchesneau assumed the risk of using the gymnasium.   
 Duchesneau responds that the District Court’s ruling was incorrect because § 5-
326 required the exclusion in its entirety of the Document.  This misinterprets § 5-326 
and the case law applying the statute.  While it makes waivers unenforceable to bar suit, 
it says nothing about whether waiver documents can be admitted as evidence.  New York 
case law supports and further clarifies this position.  See DiMaria v. Coordinated 
Ranches, 138 A.D.2d 445, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (noting that § 5-326 “does not 
preclude the introduction of such an agreement, as redacted, into evidence . . .”).  The 
cases on which Duchesneau relies – Brancati v. Bar-U-Farm, Inc., 183 A.D.2d 1027 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992), and Owen v. R.J.S. Safety Equipment, Inc., 169 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1991) – are not on point, as they address only whether certain documents were 
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enforceable to bar suit entirely, as opposed to whether relevant portions of those 
documents would be admissible evidence in an existing suit.  The District Court correctly 
ruled that, though the Document was void under § 5-326 and therefore not enforceable as 
a complete bar to Duchesneau’s suit, portions of the Document were admissible as 
evidence that Duchesneau was warned of the risks associated with gymnastic activity.   
B. Motion for New Trial 
 After the jury returned its verdict, Duchesneau moved for a new trial, arguing that 
defense counsel’s improper references to the Document had put the issue of waiver 
before the jury and influenced the verdict. To grant a new trial, a court must determine 
that “the allegedly improper statements or conduct make it ‘reasonably probable’ that the 
verdict was influenced by the resulting prejudice.”  Forrest, 424 F.3d at 351 (citation 
omitted).  Here, even assuming that defense counsel engaged in misconduct, it is not 
“reasonably probable” that this misconduct influenced the verdict.  In returning its 
verdict, the jury stopped after answering “No” to Question 1 (whether Cornell was 
negligent) and never reached Question 3 (regarding Duchesneau’s assumption of the 
risk).  The District Court noted that 
Plaintiff’s perceived issues of disobedience of the Motion in Limine ruling and 
this Court’s directives did not go to the issue of whether or not Defendant was 
negligent.  This alleged misconduct did not affect Plaintiff’s substantial rights 
because it did not touch upon the aggrieved issues.  Plaintiff speculates that the 
jury, in its unequivocal finding of “no negligence” on the part of Cornell, 
somehow considered the concept of “waiver.”  Such speculation is unsupported by 
the record and Plaintiff simply does not meet its burden of proof that would 
require a new trial. 
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App. at 18a.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that “due to the jury’s finding 
that defendant Cornell University was not negligent, any error in this case was harmless.”  
App. at 15a.  Thus the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Duchesneau’s motion 
for a new trial.  See Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (“A motion for a new trial on issues that a jury did not reach will not be granted.”).  
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
 
